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Iqbal and
Race




In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court reaffirmed the long-standing equal
protection doctrine that government actors can only be held liable for
discriminatory conduct when they purposefully rely on a forbidden
characteristic, such as race or gender, in promulgating policy; to simply
know that minorities and women will be adversely affected by the law
does not deny these groups equal protection under the law. This Essay
interrogates this doctrine by taking a closer look at Iqbal and Feeney,
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the thirty-year-old precedent the majority cited as the source of its
antidiscrimination standard. Because Feeney was cited in neither of the
lower court opinions, its reappearance in Iqbal signals the Court's
reluctance to intervene in matters (even tangentially) related to national
security even if the government's allocation of burdens and benefits
perpetuates societal racial and gender privileges.
In Feeney, the Court upheld a Massachusetts law granting benefits
to war veterans, even though the state legislature was aware that less
than two percent of the veterans at the time were women, owing in part
to women's exclusion from military service; thirty years later, the Iqbal
Court dismissed constitutional claims against two high ranking federal
officials responsible for orchestrating modern-day round-ups of
noncitizens from so-called terrorist-breeding states, even though these
officials knew their policies would disproportionately burden individuals
of a certain racial, religious, and citizenship background.
Both cases illustrate the inertia that has befallen the Court as it
appears unwilling to engage in the traditional balancing of government
interests against individual rights on the theory that the disaffected
minorities must essentially prove that lawmakers bore them the
equivalent of ill will or animus-in Feeney's words, reiterated verbatim
in Iqbal: that the decisionmakers chose a course of action "because of
not merely in spite of [the action's] adverse effects upon an identifiable
group.
By taking a closer look at the challenged laws in Feeney and Iqbal,
by examining the Court's choice to defer to the political branches'
decisions to press ahead despite the laws' effects upon minority groups,
and by reminding ourselves of times when the Court's imagination and
innovative thinking stretched beyond the confines of formal rational
basis review, this Essay explores the limits inherent in deferring to
political actors, especially when we know they are consciously
perpetuating privilege, furthering discrimination by default. Even in
matters that arguably relate to national security and foreign policy, the
Court should never shirk its responsibility to closely scrutinize
discriminatory governmental policies that were deliberately adopted.
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I. INTERROGATING IQBAL
The Supreme Court's decision to dismiss Pakistani national Javaid
Iqbal's racial and religious discrimination claims against former Attorney
General John Ashcroft and current FBI Director Robert Mueller' should
not surprise students of constitutional immigration law, 2 post-9/11
profiling,3 or perhaps even doctrinal civil procedure.4 The Court's
unwillingness to hear the constitutionally-based charges of invidious
discrimination leveled by a foreign citizen commoner against prominent
1. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009) ("We hold that respondent's
complaint fails to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for purposeful and unlawful
discrimination against petitioners. The Court of Appeals should decide in the first
instance whether to remand to the District Court so that respondent can seek leave to
amend his deficient complaint.").
2. See, e.g., KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE HUDDLED MASSES MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND
CIVIL RIGHTS (2004) (noting how domestic equal protection norms have long been
ignored in immigration policy, contrary to the popular myth of the U.S. as primarily
welcoming of immigrants); Shoba Wadhia, Business as Usual: Immigration and the
National Security Exception, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1485 (2010) (charactering Iqbal as
part of a long pattern of race and ideological profiling within constitutional immigration
law). But see Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?: A Tentative Apology
and Prediction for our Strange But Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257 (2000) (describing constitutional immigration history as consistent
with domestic race discrimination cases decided during the same period).
3. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2005); Susan M. Akram &
Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001:
The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 295 (2002); Raquel
Aldana, The September 11 Immigration Detentions and Unconstitutional Executive
Legislation, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 5 (2004); Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration Enforcement and
Subordination: The Consequences of Racial Profiling After September 11, 34 CONN. L.
REv. 1185 (2002); Natsu Taylor Saito, Will Force Trump Legality After September 11?
American Jurisprudence Confronts the Rule of Law, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2002); Leti
Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1575 (2002).;
4. See, e.g., Ray Campbell, Getting a Clue: Two-Stage Complaint Pleading as a
Solution to the Conley-Iqbal Dilemma, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. 1191 (2010); Jeffrey
Rachlinksi, Why Heightened Pleading-Why Now? 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1247 (2010).
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members of the U.S. government fits nicely into well-known outsider
narratives in the critical legal studies vein as well.'
But what interests me about the opinion is the manner in which the
Court chose to effect the dismissal of Iqbal's discrimination claims by
resurrecting a 30-year-old case that was cited by neither the District
Court nor the Second Circuit: Personnel Administrator ofMassachusetts
v. Feeney.' The Court cited Feeney for the proposition that it was not
enough for either Ashcroft or Mueller to know that the post-9/11
interrogation and detention of certain Arab and Muslim noncitizens
would lead to a discriminatory impact upon the group. Iqbal would also
have to prove that Ashcroft and Mueller purposefully chose to target
Arab and Muslim noncitizens because of their race and religion, not in
spite of it.
That this matter was resolved at the pleading stage is remarkable.
Without examining a shred of evidence, the Court credited the
government's national security arguments by ignoring Javaid Iqbal's
ordinariness, for nothing in Iqbal's petty criminal background suggests
that he was a terrorist who deserved incarceration in a maximum security
facility. While articulating a similarly heavy burden for plaintiffs
seeking to prove invidious discrimination, the Feeney Court developed
its theory on a more robust record, having taken two appeals from careful
decisions by a three-judge district court, which examined Helen Feeney's
gender discrimination claim carefully, weighing her interests against the
legislative record underlying the Massachusetts veteran's preference law
under fire in that case.8 That the 1qbal Court was willing to defer to the
government so quickly when, thirty years earlier, it took several years
5. See generally LISA KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE: HOW THE SUPREME COURT
SIDESTEPS HARD CASES AND STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW (2001) (noting how
the Court uses procedural devices to avoid difficult substantive issues rather than to take
the opportunity to fully vet them); Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the
Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980) (arguing that Brown is best
explained not as a victory for blacks but as an example of how blacks' interests in civil
rights merged with whites' interests in a better international profile more consistent with
ideals of fair treatment and democratic values; once the white majority's interests diverge
from the black minority's, however, the minority loses); Jean Sternlight & Sylvia Lazos-
Vargas, Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Other Recent Supreme Court Decisions Demonstrate the
Need for- Greater Judicial Diversity and Judicial Prudence (2010).
6. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
7. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948-49 (2009).
8. The Feeney case was originally titled Anthony v. Commonwealth, 415 F.Supp.
485 (D. Mass. 1976), after the lead plaintiff in the original action, but over time, Feeney's
was the only action that remained, Anthony's having been mooted by the state having
created an exemption from the veteran preference for lawyerjobs. 442 U.S. at 259 & n.3.
1422 [Vol. 114:4
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(and an intervening court case in Washington v. Davis)9 to reach its
conclusion, suggests the Court's retreat from providing robust review of
equal protection claims raised in the shadow of national security.
This Essay will carefully compare Iqbal and Feeney, examining
how the Court has institutionalized inertia by failing to adequately assess
the costs of the "purposeful discrimination" standard and what this
reluctance to serve as a check on the political branches does to perpetuate
privilege and the status quo worldview. The judiciary is the only federal
branch that can consistently ensure individuals are fairly treated qua
individuals and are not subjected to a majority perspective that, by
default, defers to and preserves power, often in the form of affirming
invidious stereotypes.
Moving beyond Iqbal and Feeney, this Essay will conclude by
turning to critical decisions within the Court's jurisprudence that capture
the promise of the Equal Protection Clause by looking behind the facts to
understand how unmerited privilege is perpetuated. Cases from Brown'0
and Loving to Plyler,12 Romer,13 and Lawrencel4 cast a discerning eye
upon the government's reasons to weigh the impact that the laws have on
marginalized groups. While the shadow of Korematsu'5 reminds us daily
of its own fallibility, the Court also has a long history of championing
individual rights and correcting injustice, leveling the playing field for
the least well-off who are otherwise left unprotected by majoritarian
politics.
9. 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that plaintiffs had to prove intentional
discrimination in order to subject written qualifying examination to strict scrutiny for its
racially disparate impact on black candidates who took it).
10. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (ruling "separate but equal" public
school facilities unconstitutional).
11. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down state antimiscegenation
statute under equal protection and due process clauses).
12. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that state law denying
undocumented children free public education is unconstitutional).
13. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (finding unconstitutional a state
constitutional amendment that discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation).
14. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking state law criminalizing same-
sex relations for violating due process clause).
15. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding constitutionality of
federal Executive Order authorizing internment of Japanese Americans solely on the
basis of race).
14232010]
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II. INERTIA AROUND INTENT: THE COURT AT ITS WORST
A Javaid Iqbal: Undocumented Worker, Petty Criminal, or Suspected
Terrorist?
Javaid Iqbal may have run afoul of the law, but none of his minor
violations suggest that he had any connection with terrorism. Indeed,
Iqbal apparently had married an American citizen and was hoping to
adjust his status to lawful resident when the 9/11 attacks occurred and his
religion and national origin brought him under federal government
scrutiny. 16
A Muslim man from Pakistan, Iqbal first came to the federal
government's attention for allegedly obtaining gainful employment by
way of a false Social Security card and driver's license, a strategy not
uncommon among undocumented workers; accordingly, the government
filed a two-count indictment in November 2001.17 Upon further
investigation, the government filed a superseding indictment alleging
Iqbal's involvement in a check-kiting scheme.18  In April 2002, Iqbal
pled guilty to cashing two forged checks and to carrying a false driver's
license, for which he was sentenced to serve a mere sixteen months on
Sept. 17, 2002, a few days after the one-year anniversary of the 9/11
attacks. 19
These facts are all that we have about Iqbal's criminal activity.
Even if we were to assume his participation in the alleged check-kiting
scheme went beyond merely cashing forged checks, nothing in the public
record suggests Iqbal's tie to terrorism. Now, it may be that the
government chose not to compromise important national security
intelligence by formally charging Iqbal with terrorism, but its decision
not to incarcerate Iqbal beyond his brief sixteen-month sentence (unlike,
for instance, the Guantanamo detainees), 20 and instead to deport him
home to Pakistan, suggests that he was not a terrorist.21
16. E-mail from Alex Reinert, counsel for Iqbal, to Victor Romero (Jan. 15, 2010,
3:53 PM) (on file with author).
17. Indictment, United States v. Iqbal, No. 01-CR-1318 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2001)
(on file with author).
18. Superseding indictment, Iqbal, No. 01-CR-1318 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002) (on
file with author).
19. Email from Alex Reinert to Victor Romero, supra note 16; see also Indictment,
supra note 17, and superseding indictment, supra note 18.
20. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2009) (ruling that Congressional
substitute for habeas violates Suspension Clause); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)
(holding that noncitizen Guantanamo detainees had statutory right to habeas proceeding).
21. For more on Iqbal's background, see Complaint, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No.
04-1809 (E.D.N.Y. May 3, 2004), available at 2004 WL 3756439.
1424 [Vol. 114:4
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In contrast, the Supreme Court, based simply on a review of the
pleadings before it, had no difficulty including Iqbal among the lot of
"suspected terrorists" worthy of maximum security detention. The Court
proffers two reasons for denying the plausibility of Iqbal's claims. First,
because all nineteen of the 9/11 hijackers were Arab Muslim men who
were members of Al-Qaeda, which was led by another Arab Muslim
man, Osama bin Laden, whose followers included many other Arab
Muslim men, Ashcroft and Mueller knew that Arab Muslim men like
Iqbal would be disproportionately affected by the policy, but that their
"intent [was] to detain aliens who were illegally present in the United
States and who had potential connections to those who committed
terrorist acts," not to discriminate based on race, religion, or national
origin.22 Put differently, Ashcroft and Mueller fully expected that Arab
Muslim men would be selectively targeted by law enforcement, but not
because they were Arab Muslim men, but because they were unlawfully
present and might have been connected with the 9/11 hijackings.
Second, and similarly, the Court notes that Iqbal was not likely placed in
restrictive confinement conditions because of his race, religion, or
national origin, but because he was a "suspected terrorist," and as such,
the government's intent was "to keep suspected terrorists in the most
secure conditions available until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist
,,21
activity.
While this analysis seems plausible, the facts surrounding Iqbal's
arrest belie this. Iqbal admitted to engaging in criminal activity, for
which he received a relatively light sixteen-month sentence; he was also
therefore deportable-and his presence was unlawful-under our
immigration laws. It appears Iqbal worked in the U.S. without proper
documentation and was involved in a minor criminal offense, for which
he was duly punished. But what in his background made him a
suspected terrorist worthy of restrictive confinement? The government
presented no evidence that his involvement in the alleged check-kiting
scheme was somehow a fundraising front for Al-Qaeda; it is just as likely
that Iqbal needed more cash for himself or, more benignly, got caught up
with the wrong people and had thought he was cashing legitimate checks.
In the meantime, the decision to label him a suspected terrorist subjected
him not only to harsh confinement conditions, he alleges, but also to
beatings at the hands of prejudiced prison officials and other government
officers. 24 Furthermore, after he had served his sixteen-month sentence,
22. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009).
23. Id. at 1952.
24. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 149 (2d Cir. 2007).
2010] 1425
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Iqbal was simply released and returned to Pakistan.2 5 If he had truly
been a terrorist worthy of restrictive confinement, Iqbal would have
presumably been held longer, perhaps moved to Guantanamo or
elsewhere until the government could charge him with an appropriate
terrorism offense.
At day's end, the things he had in common with the nineteen
hijackers were things he could not or should not change: his race,
religion, and national origin. These attributes served as proxies for
dangerousness rather than evidence thereof, but the Court nonetheless
chose to credit them as incidental affronts to Iqbal's dignity in light of
what it adjudged to be the government's true and legitimate purpose: to
interrogate and detain all Arab Muslim noncitizens who were unlawfully
present in order to ascertain their ties to the 9/11 hijacking, then
reserving the most restrictive detention for those actually suspected of
terrorism. Javaid Iqbal may have been here illegally, and he may have
been involved in crime, but there is no evidence that he was ever a
terrorist threat. For the Court to disregard this reality at such an early
stage of the litigation process effectively denied it the opportunity to
more closely review the government's actions here.
B. Helen Feeney: Highly-Qualified Non- Veteran Women Need Not
Apply
Like Javaid Iqbal, Helen Feeney did not fit the profile the
government had in mind for her. Feeney was a long-time civil service
employee in Massachusetts who, time and again, was passed over for
certain competitive jobs because of the state's absolute, lifetime
preference for veterans even though her exam scores were consistently
higher than the veterans who won appointment. Here is but one example
from the District Court's opinion:
On February 6, 1971, [Feeney] took an examination for the single
position of Assistant Secretary, Board of Dental Examiners.
Although she received the second highest grade of 86.68 on the
examination, the application of the Veterans' Preference formula
caused her to be ranked sixth on the list behind five veterans, all of
whom were male and four of whom received lower grades. She was
not certified and a male veteran with an examination grade of 78.08
was appointed.26
Apparently, Feeney was not the lone female disadvantaged by the
preference. At the time of the lawsuit, over 98% of all veterans were
25. Id.
26. Anthony v. Commonwealth, 415 F. Supp. 485, 492 (D. Mass. 1976).
1426 [Vol. 114:4
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male and only 1.8% were female; this stark difference prompted the
Supreme Court to describe the adverse gender impact of the law to be
"severe." 27 The Court also noted that laws limiting military service to
women and men-only draft policies had contributed to this discrepancy. 28
Yet, as in Iqbal, the Court was reluctant to conclude that the
Massachusetts legislature intended to invidiously discriminate against
women. Even though as a class, women disproportionately bore the
burden of the veteran's preference, the state discriminated against both
men and women by preferring veterans to non-veterans. As the Court
put it, "Too many men [were] affected by [the veteran's preference] to
permit the inference that the statute [was] but a pretext for preferring
men over women."29
C. Measuring Loyalty and Disloyalty: Intent, Inertia, and the Supreme
Court
Iqbal and Feeney present us with interesting case studies of how the
Court deconstructs (dis)loyalty. In Iqbal, the Supreme Court held that
race, religion, and national origin were not the reasons for targeting Arab
Muslim noncitizens during the government's post-9/11 sweep, but their
suspected ties to terrorism were relevant. Similarly, in Feeney,
although gender would be an impermissible basis for excluding women
from the workplace, their non-veteran status would be relevant.3 1 In both
cases, the government knew that the policies it had chosen (i.e.,
interrogating and detaining suspected terrorists in one, preferring
veterans in the other) would have a disproportionate impact upon certain
groups (i.e., Arab Muslim noncitizens in one, women in the other).
Yet, the government was permitted to proceed because it had
legitimate reasons for doing so-that is, to punish the disloyalty of the
suspected terrorists (in Iqbal) and to reward the loyalty of the
presumptive patriot veterans (in Feeney). As a policy matter and at a
very general level of abstraction, it is hard to quibble with this approach.
That the political branches would create policies which honor loyal
subjects and ferret out disloyal ones makes much sense.
27. Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271 (1979).
28. Id. at 269-70 ("Notwithstanding the apparent attempts by Massachusetts to
include as many military women as possible within the scope of the preference, the
statute today benefits an overwhelmingly male class. This is attributable in some
measure to the variety of federal statutes, regulations, and policies that have restricted the
number of women who could enlist in the United States Armed Forces, and largely to the
simple fact that women have never been subjected to a military draft.").
29. Id. at 275.
30. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009).
31. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 277-78.
14272010]
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It is, however, properly the Court's role to make sure that these
policies fit the individual cases that are brought before it to test the
integrity and parameters of these rules. Based on his actions, is Javaid
Iqbal someone whom the federal government should have adjudged
sufficiently disloyal, such that he deserved restrictive confinement, or did
his status as an Arab Muslim render him either immediately or
presumptively disloyal until proven otherwise? Similarly, did Helen
Feeney's non-veteran status render her sufficiently undeserving of a civil
service job when compared with her veteran peers with lower test scores,
or did her gender serve as a convenient means to relegate women to
either less prominent work or no work at all?
A critic might contend that this (dis)loyalty theory ignores the
underlying rules of law that the Court was obliged to follow. In Iqbal,
the Court could not proceed with a Bivens action for money damages
brought by a criminal noncitizen who could not plausibly assert that two
high-ranking government officials specifically targeted him because of
his race and religion when being an Arab Muslim was a relevant attribute
of the 9/11 hijackers. Similarly, in Feeney, the Massachusetts
legislature's legitimate desire to honor loyal veterans with an
employment preference should not be deemed invidious gender
discrimination when non-veteran men, like non-veteran women, were
equally disadvantaged. Put another way, there are neutral, non-invidious
explanations that show the government's good intentions to capture the
terrorist in Iqbal and to honor the veteran in Feeney, regardless of the
race, religion, or gender of the alleged terrorist or veteran. The Court
was duty-bound to honor these legitimate reasons and reassure both Iqbal
and Feeney that their losses were not due to unlawful discrimination.
While loyalty and disloyalty are certainly legitimate subjects of
legislative debate and are presumptively beyond an unelected judiciary's
expertise, relevant precedent and psychological research caution a more
vigilant alternative to the apparent inertia and deference that has befallen
the Court in so-called national security contexts.
1. Precedent: The Court's Deference in National Security
Contexts
A brief review of Supreme Court precedent suggests that this
judicial inertia or deference to the political branches is but part of a long-
standing acquiescence to the Executive in foreign affairs,32 generally, and
to the military, in particular. For instance, in Goldman v. Weinberger,
32. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) ("In this
vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate, and manifold problems, the
President alone has the power to speak or listen as the representative of the nation.").
[Vol. 114:41428
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the Court upheld the Air Force's dress code against a religious
discrimination claim even though, as enforced, the code effectively
prevented an Orthodox Jewish doctor and ordained rabbi from wearing
his yarmulke. 3 The Court noted that its "review of military regulations
challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than
constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian
society."34 Esprit de corps and the subordination of personal interests to
the military's mission justified the code, in the Court's eyes.35 Under Air
Force regulations, Rabbi Goldman was to be loyal to his country's
military first, rather than to his God; for him to try to be loyal to both by
wearing the yarmulke and the uniform was insufficient.
Indeed, even in the Korematsu case, the Court claimed to be
applying strict scrutiny in reviewing the Executive's internment of over
100,000 Japanese-Americans, which presumptively would have
invalidated this racially-discriminatory law.3 6 Likening the law to the
curfew upheld in Hirabayashi,37 the Court had little trouble upholding
the West Coast evacuation:
[E]xclusion of those of Japanese origin was deemed necessary
because of the presence of an unascertained number of disloyal
members of the group, most of whom we have no doubt were loyal to
this country. It was because we could not reject the finding of the
military authorities that it was impossible to bring about an
immediate segregation of the disloyal from the loyal that we
sustained the validity of the curfew order as applying to the whole
group. In the instant case, temporary exclusion of the entire group
was rested by the military on the same ground.38
As in Iqbal, Korematsu involved the use of a profile for disloyalty
in justifying the targeting of a specific group. 39 And while one might
have expected the Korematsu Court to call the military to account when
it decided to profile U.S. citizens based solely on their race, as in Iqbal,
the Court was reluctant to second-guess the Executive when it cries
"national security."
Although less closely related to the national security theme than
either Iqbal or Korematsu, Feeney finds a distant cousin in the recent
case, Ricci v. DeStefano.4 0 In Ricci, white and Hispanic firefighters who
33. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
34. Id. at 507.
35. Id. at 508.
36. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
37. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
38. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218-19.
39. Id.
40. Ricci v. DeStafano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
14292010]
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applied for a job promotion sued the City of New Haven for rejecting the
results of a civil service exam on which they scored higher than all the
black firefighters who took it.41 The City defended by claiming that if it
had certified the results it would have faced a suit from the black
firefighters, alleging that the written test had a disparate impact based on
their minority race, which it did. The Court held that the City violated
Title VII's anti-race discrimination mandate by rejecting the otherwise
validated test results simply because "too many whites and not enough
minorities would be promoted were the lists to be certified." 42
Notice how Ricci parallels Feeney: Like Feeney, the plaintiff
firefighters claimed that their superior test results entitled them to certain
civil service positions. However, unlike Feeney, these white, male
firefighters fit the profile of loyal public servants whom the Court
deemed deserved to be rewarded. Much like war veterans, firefighters
enjoy a solemn respect borne out of their willingness to stand in harm's
way to protect their communities from danger. If test performance had
been the only factor relevant to employment, Feeney, like the
firefighters, would have qualified. In Feeney's case, there was an
additional factor-whether one was a veteran. Veteran status was not a
relevant concern in Ricci because they were all firefighters; they had all
proven their loyalty to their communities through their service. Put
differently, loyalty and service trump test scores (Feeney), but where
loyalty is not an issue, higher test scores prevail (Ricci).
While attractive at first blush, the above account is incomplete.
Why should higher test scores prevail in Ricci? What about the City's
race-neutral justification for rejecting the scores-i.e., that it feared a
lawsuit and wanted to make sure that whatever criteria it employed to
evaluate candidates' performances did not discriminate against minority
applicants? Why did the Ricci Court conclude that this was an
insufficient justification, but rather a purposeful decision to discriminate
against the white plaintiffs on the basis of race? Why not adopt the
Feeney or Iqbal analyses instead-to wit: the City's discrimination was
not purposeful, even though it had a disparate impact upon the white
plaintiffs for two reasons. First, as in Feeney, there were non-majority
applicants-the two Hispanics with high test scores4 3 -who also
qualified for promotion, so majority race status was not the basis for
discrimination even though a disproportionate number of whites were
affected. The true reason was to ensure a fair and accurate promotion
process, one that did not tend to promote the status quo to the detriment
41. Id. at 2661.
42. Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 152 (D. Conn. 2006).
43. 129 S. Ct. at 2666.
1430 [Vol. 114:4
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of minority applicants. The test was rejected not because the City hated
or wished ill will upon whites and Hispanics, but because it wanted to
make sure it was fair to all the applicants, including the African-
American applicants, who appeared to be disproportionately excluded
and burdened by the exam.
Or second, one might adopt the rationale from Iqbal: The City's
objective was to find the most qualified individuals and promote them; if
the data suggest that the exam may not be successfully doing that
because it appears to disadvantage one group, then the City should. be
allowed to pursue that inquiry. In other words, when the district court
described the City's concern as one focusing on race (i.e., "too many
whites")," it misunderstood the context and true import of the exam
rejection: possible unfairness in the promotion process.
Of course, the District Court's proclamation that there were "too
many whites" could have been read in much the same way as "too many
Arab Muslims" was read in Iqbal. Just as the Iqbal Court regarded the
impact on Arab Muslims as "incidental," the same could have been said
for the plaintiff firefighters in Ricci because the City had not
purposefully intended to deny them an opportunity simply because they
were white. Rather, the City sought to ensure that any process-
including any test-it made applicants complete was fair and just for all.
The question remains: Why the different characterizations of the
process? On the one hand, Feeney and Iqbal teach us that race-neutral
explanations can be more plausible than allegedly race-based
explanations. As such, the government prevails if it can reasonably
justify a policy in non-invidious terms, even if it involves the rounding-
up of Arab Muslim noncitizens (Iqbal) or the effective exclusion of
women from desirable civil service positions (Feeney). Not so in Ricci.
While the City's decision not to certify the results adversely affected
many whites, the race-neutral explanation for the rejection of the exam
results was its intent to make the process a fair one for all. Yet, a bare
majority of the Court could not accept the City's contention, instead
finding that invidious racial discrimination was at work.
But the frustration of reading Ricci alongside Feeney lies not just in
the difference in result, but rather what the narrative suggests about the
nature of the Court's inertia. I suppose, taking a look at Ricci, one might
conclude that the Court was not deferential at all. Rather, it decided to
credit the plaintiffs' race discrimination claims, but not its sister,
Feeney's, gender claims because it carefully scrutinized the record on
summary judgment, concluding there were no legitimate reasons for the
City to suspect that its exam or promotion process were racially-biased.
44. Id. at 2673.
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Yet the Court's decision to overturn the nullification of the exam results
suggests a selective inertia: The Court is loath to second-guess the
political branches' characterizations and interpretations of (dis)loyalty
and (de)merit unless their decisions seem to upset the status quo
worldview. Thus, in Ricci, the Court would not accept the City's
argument that it was suspicious of its process and wanted to ensure a fair
one in part because doing so would have led to the non-promotion of a
privileged class: predominantly white, male firefighters who had
performed well on a standardized exam. For Feeney, a woman trying to
break through the glass ceiling, for Iqbal, a Muslim Pakistani trying to
avoid the terrorist label, and for Korematsu, a Japanese-American trying
to avoid the internment, a majority of the Court had a difficult time
seeing how the political branches aimed to purposefully discriminate
against these individuals. After all, each fit a profile: a woman is likely
not a veteran (or "loyalist"), a Muslim Pakistani is likely a terrorist (or
"traitor"), and a Japanese-American, well, as then Commanding General
DeWitt put it most ineloquently, "A Jap's a Jap."4 5 In contrast, white
firefighters who scored well on their promotion exams fit the profile of a
captain or lieutenant, and therefore deserved to be promoted. For the
City of New Haven to forestall promotion because it wanted to ensure
fairness to all candidates was but a ruse; its true aim was to effectively
deny the white plaintiffs that which was rightfully theirs.
2. Inertia and the Psychology of Judging: Discrimination by
Default46
The Court's (selective) inertia-its precedential pattern of affirming
political decisions that affirm well-worn stereotypes of (dis)loyalty and
(de)merit-finds support in social psychology. When the Court
perpetuates privilege by affirming political acts that favor the status quo,
it does so not because it desires to harm the underprivileged, but because
such garden-variety discrimination has become the default rule. As legal
scholar Lu-in Wang notes:
[L]ike a default in a traditional sense, we often discriminate through
failure or neglect, reaching a bad result not through ill will or evil
45. See PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS: SIXTEEN AMERICANS
WHO FOUGHT THEIR WAY TO THE SUPREME COURT 42 (1990). On the Japanese
internment, see also ERIC L. MULLER, AMERICAN INQUISITION: THE HUNT FOR JAPANESE
AMERICAN DISLOYALTY IN WORLD WAR 11 (2007). For a comparison between Japanese
internment and post-9/11 race profiling, see Jerry Kang, Thinking Through Internment:
12/7 and 9/11, 9 ASIAN L.J. 195 (2002).
46. This is the title of Lu-in Wang's seminal work on how commonplace




purpose, but because we are unaware of our failing or are incapable
of doing differently. Social psychologists have shown, for example,
that most people are afflicted with unconscious cognitive and
motivational biases that lead us reflexively to categorize, perceive,
interpret the behavior of, remember, and interact with people of
different groups differently. These unconscious biases, in turn, can
lead us to treat people differently based on race and other irrelevant
characteristics without intending to or even being aware that we are
doing so.47
If Wang is right, then does it make sense to have a Feeney rule
requiring "because of' purposeful intent before a disparate impact claim
can be subjected to more scrutiny than the Court currently affords it? If,
at the end of the day, the crux of the constitutional inquiry is to ensure
that a person or entity acts with no animus or ill will, how does the Court
know whether a person acts out of prejudice if she herself might simply
have adopted and assimilated the current default norm (i.e., acting
prejudicially) without knowing it?
Applying such an analysis, Iqbal and Feeney become more
understandable-at least in terms of understanding the Justices-if not
more persuasive. If the majority of Justices in both Iqbal and Feeney
truly believed that their role was not to intervene in the political process
except on rare occasions, then their (selective) deference makes complete
sense: The Court assumes that, because legislatures and executives
negotiate, pass, and implement laws, it may generally not intervene.
Such an approach comports with a narrow view of the unelected judges'
role in a tripartite federal regime, but it also leads to deference to the
political branches on almost all policy questions. If such policy
questions may be justified on status-neutral grounds, the Court, not
wishing to infer ill will in others nor capable of fully monitoring its own
biases, will necessarily defer to the considered judgment of the political
branches. A court adopting such a stance will likewise necessarily
uphold the status quo more times than not. So, in 1qbal and Feeney, the
Court trusts that the government played by the rules in both of these
cases: that, absent specific proof of a discriminatory purpose, any law
that was duly passed, but had a disparate impact on an identifiable group,
would be entitled to a presumption of constitutionality.
Steve Legomsky has tackled a similar set of issues in the thorny
context of the current debate surrounding undocumented migrants, often
an emotionally-charged affair.4 8 He notes that immigration restrictionists
47. Id. at 8-9.
48. Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraits of the Undocumented Immigrant: A Dialogue,
44 GA. L. REV. 65, 159-60 (2009) ("While the social science literature reveals the overall
impact of illegal immigration on the interests of the larger society to be mixed and
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tend to view the undocumented in the aggregate as an undifferentiated
group whose large numbers pose a challenge to our capacity to
effectively uphold the rule of law through attrition by deportation.49
Immigrant rights advocates, on the other hand, tell stories of specific
individuals who have been unjustly treated, stigmatized, or simply
rendered invisible by their lack of ability to gain proper documentation
and assume a settled life in the U.S. 0
These different perspectives help explain each sides' policy
preferences in the immigration debate, and perhaps help us further
explain the Court's (selective) inertia. In cases where the Court views
the individual as part of an aggregate, as part of a group that the political
branches have decided to legislate for or against, the Court is
correspondingly reluctant to substitute its judgment on this political
matter for the equally considered judgment of its colleagues in the
federal or state legislatures. So, in Iqbal, if the administration decides
that sufficient evidence and intelligence linked Iqbal to the 9/11 terrorists
to warrant categorizing him as a "suspected terrorist," the Court would
be inclined to defer to that call. However, if the Court had been willing
to more strictly study Iqbal qua Iqbal-that is, Iqbal the individual-
perhaps it would have been willing to let the case against Ashcroft and
Mueller proceed, forcing the government to clearly articulate what it was
in Iqbal's petty criminal history that warranted labeling him a potential
threat. As a normative matter, while it may be understandable that
political branches concerned with the difficult challenge of enacting
broad policy may tend, more than the individual decisionmaker, to
categorize and compromise, courts have the luxury of choice and the
responsibility to check the political branches for abuse. For the judge,
choosing to look at the individual as individual rather than as part of an
undifferentiated aggregate mass appears to comport better with the
bench's responsibility as the apolitical branch assigned to impartially
interpret and infuse constitutional equal protection with meaning,
insulating individuals from any ill effects and unintended consequences
the blunt instrument of legislation might create.
So far, we have learned from Lu-in Wang that we all discriminate,
sometimes subconsciously," and that, from Steve Legomsky, we should
uncertain, the effects of proposed solutions on the interests of the individual
undocumented immigrants and their families are typically clear-cut. That contrast
reinforces the case for placing greater weight on the latter and, therefore, giving
undocumented immigrants the benefit of the doubt when the policy questions are close.")
(emphasis added).
49. Id. at 70.
50. Id.
51. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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make conscious choices about how we should assess the impact of law
on people as individuals. 52 Both perspectives help explain the (selective)
inertia that seems to have afflicted the Supreme Court. This is a court
that generally upholds the status quo, (un)consciously supporting
discrimination by default, and usually refusing to closely examine the
individuals before it as individuals.
Might the racial and gender makeup of the judiciary make a
difference in terms of its ability to be aware of societal bias and its
willingness to hold the political branches accountable for perpetuating
privilege and discrimination by default? Two recent studies suggest that
the answer to this question may be "yes." In her 2005 study, Jennifer
Peresie found that female judges were "significantly more likely than
male judges"5 3 to find for plaintiffs in federal sex discrimination and
sexual harassment claims. More recently, Pat Chew and Robert E.
Kelley released the results of their twenty-year study of the differences
between African-American and other judges in federal workplace
harassment cases.54  They found that African-American judges were
significantly more inclined to rule for plaintiffs than were white and
Hispanic judges. Interestingly, Chew and Kelley also found that a
judge's gender was not a significant factor.5 6 Perhaps these findings are
not all that surprising. In general, a woman might be in a better position
to understand the contours of a sexual harassment claim than a man
might, even though she may not necessarily understand a racial
harassment claim as well as a judge of color might. While Chew and
Kelley are quick to point out that their findings do not help predict how
an individual judge may rule in a particular case,5 7 the study does give
the lie to the idea of the truly colorblind judge, thereby reinforcing
Wang's thesis that we all tend to discriminate by default.
While embracing greater racial and gender diversity among judges
may appear to help the Court overcome its inertia affliction, I believe
even more important will be ensuring that the Court re-embrace its role
as the federal body best suited to call discriminatory policies to account
by utilizing its power of judicial review to focus on the individual qua
individual, and not simply to defer to the political branches, in effect
perpetuating discrimination by default. As the next section will
52. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
53. Jennifer Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial
Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1761(2005).
54. Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color Blind Judge: An Empirical
Analysis ofRacial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REv. 1117 (2009).
55. Id. at 1141.
56. Id. at 1144.
57. Id. at 1156.
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demonstrate, the Court, at its best, has been, even as an overwhelmingly
white, male body, an institution that has taken seriously its role as
protector of individual liberties by closely examining where tyranny
persists and unfailingly striking it down in the name of equal protection.
III. IMAGINATION AND INNOVATION: THE COURT AT ITS BEST
Many regard Brown v. Board ofEducation5 8 as marking the birth of
the modem Supreme Court, and with good reason. That landmark,
unanimous opinion struck down the long-standing practice of segregating
schoolchildren based solely on the color of their skin. 9 I would like to
begin this discussion of the Court's "greatest hits," however, some
twelve years after Brown, with a quote from the Supreme Court's
decision in Loving v. Virginia, in which the Court dismissed
antimiscegenation laws as unconstitutional:
There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of
invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification. The
fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white
persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on
their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White
Supremacy. We have consistently denied the constitutionality of
measures which restrict the rights of citizens on account of race.
There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely
because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause. 60
In this relatively short opinion, the Court was quick to note that the
only conceivable purpose for the Virginia statute was to maintain "White
Supremacy." 6 1 It is interesting to observe that, although all of them were
white, none of the judges took offense at the use of the term. Why?
Because "white" was not simply a word to describe the color of a
person's skin; it was used here to symbolize an ideology: that white
people are superior over others. In the context of that time, the phrase
was meant to convey the idea that white people were in power and that
they deserved to be in power. The Supreme Court's decision to use the
term "White Supremacy" and to question its validity made clear that
perpetuating race-based privilege violated the core constitutional value of
equal treatment under the law.
I would respectfully suggest that it would be impossible to imagine
the Supreme Court using the phrase "White Supremacy" today to
58. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
59. Id.




describe an otherwise legitimately enacted law by a state legislature.
Even though white people still hold the reins of power in the United
States, our country no longer has an official policy of maintaining
segregated facilities based on an idea of white superiority. There
remains, however, an unequal distribution of power in American society,
and just as it did in Loving, the Court should be willing to call Congress
and state legislatures to task when politicians pass laws that seem to
maintain power only for the sake of maintaining power, especially when
done at the expense of the most vulnerable in society.
The good news is that the Court has, from time to time, done
exactly that. What the Court failed to do in Iqbal and Feeney, under the
guise of presuming unintentional behavior, it did in Brown and Loving,
as well as in Plyler v. Doe,6 2 Romer v. Evans,63 and most recently, in
Lawrence v. Texas." In each of the last three cases, arguably utilizing
little more than its traditional rational basis review-the same standard it
effectively applied in Iqbal and Feeney-the Court treated the plaintiffs
qua individuals, thwarting the stereotypical profile and truly analyzing
the effects of the laws on the human beings before it.
In Plyler v. Doe, Texas decided to employ a cost-cutting measure to
shore up the resources it devoted to public education: it chose to deny all
undocumented children the free education it provides for lawful
residents. The Court assumed no ill will on the part of the state toward
the undocumented children or their families. It did not view the law as a
proxy for race discrimination. Rather, it weighed the purported benefits
of the law against its costs.
In a close, 5-4 decision, the majority found it irrational and unfair
that children were being penalized for the transgressions of their
parents.66 First, the children were not to blame for their undocumented
status, as they were neither the cause of their condition nor had they an
effective way to cure the situation.67 And second, Texas's exclusionary
policy would, in the long run, lead to the creation of a permanent
underclass of uneducated youth.68 Accordingly, the state's goal of
conserving resources by denying public benefits to undocumented
children was not a substantial interest, and therefore, irrational.69
62. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
63. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
64. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
65. 457 U.S. 202.
66. Id. at 219-20.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. "[T]he discrimination contained in [Tex. Educ. Code] § 21.031 can hardly be
considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the State." Id. at 222.
Despite its reference to a rationality standard, the Plyler majority is typically read as
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Though perhaps less than obvious, the parallels between Plyler and
Iqbal are striking. Both involve undocumented persons the state has
chosen to target. Although Javid Iqbal is an adult, not a child, and
deemed a suspected terrorist, not one seeking public education, I find the
Plyler Court's discussion of the "sins of the parent being visited on the
child" to have resonance when considering Iqbal's situation: At bottom,
Iqbal's discrimination claim is that his national origin, race, and religion
were used as proxies by Ashcroft and Mueller in the decision whether or
not to include him in the post-9/11 round-up. Like the children's
undocumented status in Plyler, Iqbal's race, religion, and national origin
were all statuses he inherited from his forebears. Just as the
undocumented children cannot be blamed for their undocumented status,
neither should Iqbal have been blamed for his race, religion, or national
origin by labeling him a suspected terrorist when, as previously
discussed, there was nothing in his conduct to suggest he was one.
While a critic might point out the lack of a security concern in
Plyler, I am not so sure the state of Texas would have characterized the
issue so cavalierly: The state's decision to pass the law was based on a
concern that its public education system would be seriously undermined
should it need to continually support undocumented children in its
midst. 70  That the Plyler majority was able to strike the Texas law
without having to find Feeney-like purposeful intent or accusing the state
legislature of animus suggests that it sought to dismantle all official
barriers to educational privilege; this was clear in its citation to Brown v.
Board of Education in support of its approach.7 1 Noting the importance
of education as the state's investment in every child's future, the Court
was loath to deny some that opportunity based solely on their federal
immigration status. Had the Iqbal Court taken a similarly long view, it
may have decided to let the case proceed in order to hold the federal
government accountable for choosing to use race, religion, and national
origin as relevant proxies in the war on terror.
having employed a heightened scrutiny standard, otherwise, Texas's cost-cutting reasons
for denying a non-suspect class public benefits would arguably have been rational. See,
e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 776 (3d ed.
2006) ("[I]t appears that the Court was using intermediate scrutiny in evaluating the
discrimination against undocumented alien children with regard to education."). Like
Gayle Pettinga, I am not sure how this differs from "rational basis with bite," either in
theory or in operation, but it strikes me as important that the Court would deem irrational
a state cost-savings measure. See, e.g., Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basis with Bite:
Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779 (1987).
70. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 207.
71. Id. at 222-23.
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Like Plyler, Romer v. EvanS7 2 also presents a situation wherein the
state's populace appeared sufficiently threatened by a group of people so
that it felt compelled to pass legislation limiting their access to certain
privileges. But unlike in Plyler, the people of Colorado chose not to
simply pass legislation to mark the divide between sexual majorities and
minorities; through the initiative process, a majority of Coloradans
passed Amendment 27 to the state constitution. Their stated goals were
twofold: (1) to respect citizens' freedom of association, especially those
of landlords and employers who had religious objections to
homosexuality, and (2) to conserve state resources so government might
protect other groups from discrimination. 74 On a 6-3 vote, the Court
viewed the amendment as being so overbroad that it could not have
possibly been limited to these two objectives. The sheer breadth of the
provision could only be explained by animus toward those of a
homosexual orientation.76
Evan Gerstmann's study of Romer and its aftermath suggests that
the Court got it partially right.7  Gerstmann notes that Amendment 2
passed by a narrow margin: 53.4% voted for it, while 46.6% voted
against it; interestingly, polls conducted by the Denver Post before and
after the vote suggest that most Coloradans did not believe in
discriminating against homosexuals in the areas of employment and
housing, for example, which Amendment 2 would have allowed.78 The
Court was right that the Amendment had a much broader sweep than
what the voters appeared to have contemplated, thus undercutting one of
the state's primary justifications for the law.
Still, for the few voters who would have allowed landlords and
employers the privilege of not serving or hiring sexual minorities, was
such a perspective tantamount to animus against gays and lesbians? As
Justice Scalia noted in dissent:
The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite .... Of
course it is our moral heritage that one should not hate any human
being or class of human beings. But I had thought that one could
consider certain conduct reprehensible-murder, for example, or
polygamy, or cruelty to animals-and could exhibit even "animus"
toward such conduct. Surely that is the only sort of "animus" at issue
72. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
73. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b.
74. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 632.
77. EVAN GERSTMANN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERCLASS: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND
THE FAILURE OF CLASS-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION (1999).
78. Id. at 12, 99-102.
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here: moral disapproval of homosexual conduct .... The Colorado
amendment does not, to speak entirely precisely, prohibit giving
favored status to people who are homosexuals; they can be favored
for many reasons-for example, because they are senior citizens or
members of racial minorities. But it prohibits giving them favored
status because of their homosexual conduct-that is, it prohibits
favored statusfor homosexuality.79
Paraphrasing Justice Scalia, is one's disapproval of certain conduct
on moral grounds the same as hating that person? Shouldn't a landlord
or an employer be able to assert her constitutionally-protected religious
convictions by refusing to condone conduct she finds immoral?
But this is where the dissent misunderstands the majority, providing
yet another lesson for our 1qbal inquiry, as well. Justice Scalia confuses
act with status, for Amendment 2, by its terms, would have permitted
discrimination based on one's homosexual orientation-or status-as
well as action.8o For instance, even assuming Coloradans meant to
preserve a landlord's right to deny those who engage in same-sex
activities a rental apartment, Amendment 2 would have also extended
that right to deny those with a "homosexual orientation"-a phrase that
connotes status, not conduct. As a practical matter, how would a
landlord discern whether an applicant had a "homosexual orientation?"
Presumably, this judgment would be based on stereotyped notions of
whether the person fit the profile of a homosexual. If so, this analysis
draws us back again to Iqbal. Just as a landlord would presumably - and
unconstitutionally-have relied on stereotypes to assess a person's
"homosexual orientation," the Court was hard-pressed to articulate
reasonable grounds for this mistreatment based solely on Iqbal's conduct
beyond the fact that he shared the same race and religion as the 9/11
hijackers.
Moreover, one does not have to hate a specific group to perpetuate
or promote privilege. This is the core lesson of Lu-in Wang's work:8 I
discrimination happens by default. It is therefore the Court's job to help
guard against discrimination's most invidious forms. Just as it was
willing to do in Loving, the Court should stand against "White [read:
"Majority"] Supremacy" in its broadest sense-that is, the preservation
of the status quo worldview based on existing unearned and unexamined
privilege. Plyler and Romer are reminders of how the Court did exactly
that, and how it could have found a similarly thoughtful solution in Iqbal
79. Romer, 517 U.S. 620, 636, 644 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
80. Id. at 620 (noting Amendment 2's language).
81. See supra part 11.
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by requiring the government to prove Javaid Iqbal's specific tie to
terrorism, justifying his mistreatment.
To round out the trilogy begun with Pyler and Romer, let us take a
brief look at Lawrence v. Texas.82 Under the category of "deviate sexual
intercourse," Texas criminalized certain acts engaged in by persons of
the same sex.83 For doing what many adult couples do in the privacy of
their own homes, John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner were
convicted under that law when police discovered them (having
responded to what turned out to be a phony report of a weapons
violation).84  The Court, by a 6-3 margin, ruled the statute
unconstitutional for violating plaintiffs' liberty interests under the Due
Process Clause.85  Examining the history of anti-sodomy laws, the
development of its own precedent, the emerging acceptance of private
sexual conduct as an important aspect of individual liberty, and the
stigma even a minor criminal conviction begets, the Court concluded that
the Texas statute furthered "no legitimate state interest which [could]
justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual."86
As to the justification on moral grounds, the majority borrowed a line
from Justice Stevens: "[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State
has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither
history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from
constitutional attack."87
Just as the antimiscegenation laws struck down in Loving promoted
"White Supremacy" as a moral notion, laws criminalizing same-sex acts
arguably promote "heterosexual supremacy," both terms code words for
unearned and unexamined privilege. Similarly, labeling Iqbal a terrorist
suspect worthy of special detention based solely on his race, religion, and
national origin promote the status quo worldview and leave the
government unaccountable for its stereotypical reliance on proxies for
disloyalty and dangerousness. Like Romer and ostensibly, Plyler,
Lawrence was decided without resort to some higher level of scrutiny.
The law's irrational criminalization of private sexual conduct between
consenting adults required no special review.
A critic may argue that Lawrence and Iqbal are similar only at the
most general level of abstraction, that the country's concerns over
national security in Iqbal far outweigh the state's in Lawrence. On the
82. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
83. Id. at 563 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.06).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 579.
86. Id. at 578.
87. Id. at 577-78.
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contrary, of the three cases I discussed in this section, Lawrence most
closely approximates Iqbal from the perspective of the state's interest in
security. In Plyler and Romer, the states were concerned with the proper
allocation of benefits among persons it deemed not entitled to full (i.e.,
because undocumented) or "special" (i.e., because of their sexual
orientation) protection from the state; these classifications were achieved
through the use of civil laws-a civil statute in Texas, a constitutional
amendment in Colorado. In Lawrence, by contrast, Texas chose to use
its criminal law regime, not the civil laws, to target the group at issue. A
state's use of its penal system is a strong analogue to the nation's use of
its antiterrorism procedures-both regimes seek to maintain the integrity
of the polity by subjecting suspects and violators to detention and
incarceration, respectively. That Texas saw it fit to criminalize private,
consensual adult sex rather than, for example, passing a "no special
rights law" of the kind tried in Colorado, suggests the threat homosexual
conduct posed in the imagination of the state legislature. And in the end,
the Lawrence Court did not hesitate to find those fears unfounded by
striking the morals-based law, for it did not rationally advance a
legitimate concern but rather demonized a class of people for no better
reason than that it had the votes to do so. The Iqbal Court would have
done well to have approached the issues of security and stereotype with
the same equanimity and resolve.
IV. IQBAL AND THE INDIVIDUAL
Dismantling ensconced privilege, whether in the form of legislation
or executive order, requires vigilance by the judiciary. The Court's
retreat in Iqbal through its citation to Feeney's purposeful intent standard
betrays the legacy of its more notable commitments to individual liberty,
particularly in its pathbreaking decisions in Plyler, Romer, and
Lawrence. Declaring itself bound by formulaic notions of rational basis
review, the Supreme Court in Iqbal revealed itself a prisoner to a lack of
imagination and a purveyor of the status quo worldview. This Essay is a
call for the Court to heed, in Lincoln's words, "the better angels of our
nature,"88 for to not do so mires us in a world of discrimination by
default, when the hope and wisdom of an independent judiciary reveals
the promise of a democracy more just and fair.
88. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (March 4, 1861).
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